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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

RELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE IN-1
SURAN CE COMP ANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
)
JAM1£S E. CAINE, dba Caine Agency,

Case No.
10940

Defendant and Appellant.

R~.JSPONDENT'S

PETITION FOR REHEARING

AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

ri_io

THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND TO

'l'HE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
The Petitioner respectfully requests a rehearing in
the above entitled cause and that the decision be modi-

fied as hereinafter suggested, for the reasons and upon
the grounds following:
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1. The decision of this Court to i·everse the decision
of the trial court is based upon grounds not argued bv
either party and npon which Respondent has had n~
opportunity to be heard.

2. That the decision of this Court and the con.
curring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett reversing the
judgment of the trial court are based, in part, upon a
misunderstanding of the record.
3. That the decision of this Court and the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett places the blame
upon the Respondent for the long delay in submitting
findings and judgment to the trial court, which blame
appears to have influenced the majority decision. The
record does not support placing this blame upon the
Respondent.
\VHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully submits that
a rehearing should be had and the decision revised, be·
lieving that a re-examination of the record will assist
the court better to understand the record certified, and
will result in a revision and reversal of the decision
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
MOFFAT, IVERSON AND
TAYLOR

By -----------------------------------------·-J. Grant Iverson
Attorneys for Petitioner

3
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT TO REVERSE
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS BASED
UPON

GROUNDS

NOT

ARGUED

BY

EITHER

PARTY, AND UPON WHICH RESPONDENT HAS
NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

11 he Appellant argued his case under three points,
(1) that the trial court erred in considering the two depo-

sitions ( of Mr. Mortensen and Mr. Cosby) in its decision; (2) the trial court erred in granting judgment
against Caine for $6,762 with no accounting records, no
testimony as to the conclusion reached and no evidence
of any type or description as to how the money judgment
was determined; and (3) where there is no competent
evidence in a law case to warrant the Findings of Fact
and Decision, the Supreme Court may interfere and hold
the findings and decision void.

As to Appellant's Point 1:
Neither Justice Tuckett nor Chief Justice Crockett
made any reference thereto. J nstice Ellett, in his disfi('nting opinion, iminkd out that the trial court did not
en in considering the depositions.
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As to Appellant's Point 2:
It is true that when Appellant filed his brief th1,
record did not contain "any accounting records nor te 8ti.
rnony as to the conclusion reached and no evidence of
any type or description as to how the money judgment
1
\ .ras determined."
However, the trial court certified i11
its Order for Transmittal of Evidence Omitted fro 111
Record on Appeal for Inclusion on Appeal "from \!11:
evidence, arguments and affidavits and from the ConrL
recollE~ction of the proceedings" those matters whicl1
answered Appellant's Point 2.
This order recites in part:
"At said hearing one Jack Fletcher, treasurer
and keeper of the financial records of Reliance
National Life Insurance Company, was sworn and
testified from Plaintiff's records in his posses·
sion, reflecting the status of the account betwM
Reliance National Lifr Insurance Company and
James E. Caine. That from said records, the sairl
Jack Fletcher testified that the Defendant Jamei
E. Caine was indebtt>d to the Pltintiff Reliance
National Life Insurance Company as of the datr
of said trial in the amount of $6,762.73."
However, Justice

r:i~uckett

stated:

"The Defendant here contends that the findingi
and judgment of the Court are not supporttrl
by the evidence at the trial."
Is it true that the order above quoted does not 811JI
port the

judgment~
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Is it not usual for a witness testifying to an account
and having the records in his possession to state that
he has checked the account as disclosed by the records,
and that by so doing determined that A is indebted to
B in a certain amonnU If the other side does not crossl'xamine, is the evidence insufficienU
The trial court stated (R. 287) :
"H is clear in my mind as to what took placl~
at the hearing of this matter. Mr. Davis says that
John Farr Larsen, that he does not recall crossexamining him, but my recollection is that we had
a - he had these books and records here, testified,
and after we got through we either had a recess,
either for the same day or a future day, to give
Mr. Larsen a chance to go into these records.
That is my recollection that we had these records
here and Mr. Larsen was interested in those records." (R. 286-287)
It may be true that Mr. Larsen did not cross-exam-

ine, but he did have Richmond, Jones and Anderson,
certified public accountants, prepare an audit report
from the records of Reliance dated July 30, 1956, which
\li:,;dmws that Caine owed Respondent approximately
the same amount as Fletcher testified to, and the trial
court ordered Respondent to pay Richmond, Jones and
Anderson $695 for preparing the audit. (R. 166)
Respondent will discuss this audit hereafter.

As to AppeUant's Point 3:
The opinions of Justices Tuckett and Ellett and
Chief Justice Crockett make no reference to this point.
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POINT II.
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT AND THE CONCURRING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE CROCKETT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE BASED, IN PART, UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE RECORD.

Chief Justice Crockett stated:

"It (opinion of .Justice Tuckett) does not tah
the position that the judgment is invalid, bu!
simply that on the state of the record it is impo~
sible to tell whether it is valid and sustainable or
not ...
" ( 1) Where there are essential issues which it i~
impossible to review properly because of the unsatisfactory state of the record and
" ( 2) ·where this situation appears largely due\o
the fault of the Plaintiff, I agree that
" ( 3) the ends of justice will be best served by
remanding the case for trial."
Respondent wishes to discuss the above statements
(1), (2) and (3).

Justice Tnckett referred to a stipulation in whicl1
the parbes agreed that before an accounting could be
made from the books of the company, it was first necessary that the Conrt determine certain matters of lair
relating to the forfeiture provision of the contract, and
that a part of the stipulation was:
"That before the matter can he properly and fully
adjudicated, tht~ Conrt mnst decide whethrr the
('vid<>nce is such as to require a forfiturc a.s ~'.;
scribed in Paragraph 10 of the agency snperv1soJ,
contract."
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Justice rruckett further stated:

"It would appear that Caine"s contention was

that Reliance had breached the contract and that,
by reason of the breach, Reliance was barred from
declaring a forfeiture.
" ( 1) Whatever evidence was before the Court
respecting this matter is no longer available.
"It will be noted that the efforts of Court and
counsel to supply by affidavit and a certificate a
r!:'cord of testimony which supports the Court's
findings and judgment only to go to one issue
of fact.
"(2) It appears that there are other issues upon
which the Court undoubtedly took testimony and
upon which findings should have been made, but
that testimony is not here for review."
Justice Tuckett also stated:
"(3) An important fact in this case is that the
long delay in submitting findings and judgment to
the Court by the prevailing party contributed to
the impossibility of obtaining a transcript of the
testimony at the time of appeal."
Respondent desires to discuss the above statements
(1), (2) and (3).
Respondent has indicated an intention to discuss
Justice Tuckett's statements (1), (2) and (3) and Chief
Justice Crockett's statements (1), (2) and (3).
All of said statements relate to this point - misunderstanding of the record. However, Chief Justice
Crockett's statement (2) and Justice Tuckett's statement
\3) are tlw subject of Petitioner's Point III and will be
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discussed under Point III, leaving Chief Justice Crock
ett's statements (1) and (3) and Justice Tnckett's stat('
rnents (1) and (2) to be discussed under this Point u

As to Justice Tuckett's Statement (1):
.T ustice Tuckett stated:
"It wonld appear that Caine's contention was thal
Reliance had breached the contract and that 1n
'
reason of the breach, Reliance was barred from
declaring a forfeiture. Whatever evidence wa1
before the Court respecting this matter 1s no
longer available."
'

No evidence was introduced upon this matter.
Defendant stipulated on November 23, 1960 (R. 29)
before the Memorandum Decision was entered on Jann·
ary 5, 1961 (R. 25-26), that if the Court df'cides that
the forfeiture provision should be invoked, "We havP
no issue of fact." (R. 29)
Defendant stated (R. 29) :
"W onld a prior hr<'ach b~, Plaintiff bar the appll·
cation of the forfoitm<' provision of the agency
supervisor's contract if they were otherwise applicable? Defondant 's position. Yes.
"In substance, Defondant alleges and Plaintiff
denies that on several occasions Plaintiff withheld
from Defendant certain commissions. If the Court
determines this question of law in the affinnatiYl',
then we have a question of fact as to whrther
there was a breach, and Defendant should .br
permitted to offer his evidPnce on this point, '~'It::
Plaintiff permitted to rebut. If the Court drcidt .
this question in the n0gativt>, we have no issne 01
fact."
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The trial court in the Memo rand nm Decision stated:
"That any prior breach by the plaintiff, if any,
would not be a bar to the application of the forfeiture provision of the agency supervisor's contract." (R. 25)
Thereafter Defendant did not attempt to put in evidence
anything on this matter.

As to Chief Justice Crockett's statement (1) and
Justice Tuckett's Statement (2):
Chief Justice Crockett ::;tated that m the state of
record it is impossible to tell whether the judgment
of the trial court is valid and sustainable or not
t11l'

" ( 1) where there are essential issues which it

is impossible to review properly because of the
unsatisfactory state of the record."

J nstice Tuckett stated:

"It will be noted that the efforts of Court and
counsel to supply by affidavit and a certificate
a record of testimony which supports the Court's
findings and judgment only go to one issue of
fact.
"(2) It appears that there are other issues upon
which the Court undoubtedly took testimony and
npon which findings should have been made, but
that testimony is not here for review."

If there had been such i::;snes and testimony thereon,
~hould not tlw Dt'fendant have made an effort to supply

the record therPon i (Rule 75 (rn) Rules of Civil Procedure).
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There were only three other issues. Upon these,
two were issues upon which findings were made (thi
forfeiture problem and the duty to account question).
rrhe third issue (the bonus commission) is of little im.
portance and is included in the issue of the amount
owing by Defendant.
A careful consideration of Defendant's 8tatemen\
of the Case dated November 23, 1960 (R. 27-32) 11ill
disclose that Defendant did not introduce evidence upon
any other issue than those plainly before the Conrt
in the record. Defendant in said Statement of the Ca~~
fully discussed these issues. He stated (R. 28):
"Howeyer, it has been apparent to both partie~
that the matter cannot be properly dispo8ed ol
until the Court determines certain questions o!
law and fact. With these matters determined, th~
controversy should be easily solved.
"Matters to be Determined:
"The basis question in this lawsuit is to determinr·
the status of the account between the parties, i.e.,
who owes who and how much.
"The account between the parties cannot be asC'l'T·
tained until certain other matters are determined
by the Court. These matters revolve around (1)
The Bonus Comimssion, (2) The Forfeiture Prob·
lem, (3) The Duty to Account Question."

It will be noted that in Defendant's Statement ol
the Case of November 23, 1963, reference is not made to
any other issues (R. 27, 32).
As to (1), the Bonus Commission, Richmond and
Jones calculated in its audit report of July 30, 19G~,
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the bonus co11urnss10n to be $645.32 for the period of
F1•hrnary l, 195G to December 31, 195G. Defendant ter111inn tPd his contract as of August 20, 1956 and would not
lw entitled to receive bonus commission thereafter. Thus,
tlw honns commission should be calculated only from
Febrnary l, 1956 to August 20, 1956. Upon a pro rata
basis (seven of the twelve months, February through
Angust) this commission would be $376.39
lfrspondent admits that Appellant is entitled to
l1onns eornmission from February 1, 1956 to August 20,
195G - $376.39.
As to (2), the Forfeiture Problem, this has been
<lisrnssPd above under Justice Tuckett's statement (1).

TlH' .Memorandum Decision included:
"The evidence indicates clearly that the forfeiture
provision should be applied."

It was applied in the Findings, Conclusions and
.Tudguwnt (R. 47-52).
"\s to (3), the Duty to Account, Ap1wllant argues
(R. 31):
''May an insurance cornpany having a duty to
account ... which fails or refuses to provide an
accounting ... and as a result such employee is
l'l'quin•d to have the account audited ... be requin·cl to pay the costs of such audit1"
The Conrt ordered the Respondent to pay the
aeconntants $(i73.00 for th<>ir services and the judgment
SO

JlrOYidPS.
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As to Chief Justice Crockett's statement (3): Chiel
Justice Crockett stated:
"I agree that the ends of justice will be besl
served by remanding the case for trial."

The audit introduced by the Appellant, together witn
the fact that Caine resigned on August 20, 1956 (Ex
D-3), discloses that Defendant is indebted to Respondent
in the approximate amount of Respondent's judgment
$G,7G2.73. Richmond, Jones and Anderson, CPA's (hen
inafter referred to as R J & A) employed by Appellant
submitted the audit report dated July 30, 1960, two day~
before the hearing of August 1, 1960, of which we haw
a transcript. On the last page of the transcript appears
a question by the Court concerning the reasonableness
of $G95.00 charged for the audit. That is the amount thr
judgment provides that Respondent pay to R J & A
During the hearing of January 11, 1968, counsel for
Respondent stated:
"Richmond and ,J ont>s did submit an audit."
to which the Con rt answered:
"Right". (R. 29)
Appellant in his Statement of the Case, stated (R.
27):
"The books were audited by Richmond, Jones and
Anderson."
and at R-31 stated:
"Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with. an
' mreo
accounting and as a n~snlt Defendant was 1eq
to have an audit made."
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This audit discloses:
Creditt; for commissions earned by Caine (Exhibit 1):
February --------------------------------------------------$ 558.88
March --------------·---------·-------·---·------------------- 1,422.86
April -----------------------------------------·---------------- 19,643.12
Nf ay ----------------------------------------·--------------··--- 2,846.69
June ----------------------------------------------------·------- 3,052.41
J nly --------------------·-----------·--------------------------- 4,032.60
August ------------------------------------------------------ 3,643.21
Septembe1· ------------------------------------------------ 4,426.11
October ----------------------------··--·-·-···--··----··--·-· 2,677 .16
November ----------·-·····----------------------···-------- 1,628.50
December -----·-------------------------------------------- 3,825. 71

1957

January -----------------------------------------------------800.62
Total commissions earned by
Caine --------------------------------------------------$48,567 .87
Credits to Caine (Exhibit A) :
Commissions earned (as above) __________ $48,567.87
Director's fee -------------------------------------------10.00
Bonus -------------------------------------------------------645.34
0Yerwrite premiums not account for____ 1,987.75
'l'otal credits to Caine
shown by audit --------------------------------$51,210.96
These credits include commissions earned,
bonuses and overwrite premiums credited to
Caine after his resignation on August 20, 1956.
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Charges against Cai1w (Exhibit A):
Advances to agents --------------------------------$15,866.89
Advances to J arnt•s E. Caine ________________ 14,850.00
Telephone calls ---------------------------------------169.68
United Airlines ---------------------------------------258.24
Plans, Hennings, Draper, etc ________________
356.38
Legal, Fabian Clendenin, etc. ______________ 1,560.00
Advertising ---------------------------------------------118.68
Trave 1 -------------------------------------------------------- 1,596. 72
Returned clwcks - commercial
349.69
chargebacks ---------------------------------------------Commissions retained ---------------------------550.52
Agents balances charged to
J. E. Caine ------------------------------------------------ 2,962.89
Totals charges ----------------------------------$43,581.69
Deductions for commissions earned, bonus,
and overwrite premiums credited to Caine
after he resigned:
Commissions earned:

Sept<~mber ----------------------------------------$ 4,426.11
Octoh0r ---------------------------------------------- 2,677.lG
November -----------------------------------------· 1,628.50
December ------------------------------------------ 3,825.71
1957
Jan nary -------------------------------------------800.62
Bonuses (5/12 of $G45.32 for months
of ReptPmber to Jan nary, inclusive__
268.90
Overwrit<-> premiums (5/12 of $1,987.75
for months of September to January,
inclusive) ---------------------------------------------828.30
$14,455.30
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'L1otal charges against Caine (Exhibit A)----$4:3,581.69
Deductions for commissions, bonus, and
overwrite credited to Caine after he
resigned ------------------------------------------------------------ 14,455.30
Total charges against Caine ----------------$58,036.99
Total charg<>s and deductions against
Cairn: (Set~ next above) ----------------------------------$58,036.99
'l'otaL eredits to Caine (see above) ____________$51,210.96
Net owing by Caine to Respondent ----$ G,826.03
~d owing by Caine as per audit ----------------$ 6,826.03
,Judgment entered against Caine ---------------- G,762.73
Difference between audit and
judgment --------------------------------------------------$
63.30
As stated above, the audit discloses approximately
the same amount due to Respondent as the judgment
<'ntered in its favor.
Respondent submits that the ends of justice will
not be best served by requiring a retrial when the Defendant's evidence discloses that Defendant is indebted
to Plaintiff in approximately the same amount as judgment. This is particularly true when it is now nearly
eight years since this case was tried. The witnesses are
scattered, Respondent has passed through a corporate
nlPrger, and it is most unlikely that the books and
records can again be produced which were produced
at the hearing in 1960. In any event, it will cast a very
heavy hnrd<>n of effort and a heavy expenditure of money
upon the Plaintiff to retry the case, with the probability
that the Plaintiff will be unable to furnish the evidence
again.
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POINT III
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT AND THE CONCURRING OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE CROCKETT PLACES THE BLAME UPON THE RESPONDENT FOR THE LONG DELAY IN SUBMITTING
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT TO THE TRIAL
COURT, WHICH BLAME APPEARS TO HA VE INFLUENCED THE MAJORITY DECISION. THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT PLACING THE BLAME
UPON THE RESPONDENT.

In the decision of the Court written by
rruckett, he states:

Ju~tiee

"An important fact in this case is that the Ion~
delay in submitting findings and judgment to
the Court by the prevailing party contributeJ
to the impossibility of obtaining a transcript of
the testimony at the time of the appeal."
In the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Crockett,
he states:
"Due to the particular fact situation in this ca~1
where there han' lwen a number of hearings over
a period of about sewn years before the judg
ment was <>nterPd; when' there are essential issm1
·which it is impos::;iblr: to reciew properly bcca1[,)
of the it11sati0factory state of the record; 011J
where the sitiwtion appears to be largely due Iii
the fault of Plaintiff, I agree that the ends ol
1
justice will be lwst served by remanding the cas
for trial."
Bespondent admits that ordinarily a delay in pre·
1

Jaring and submitting Findings of Fact and Conclusioni
1
of Law and .T udgment to the trial conrt af tPr the rendi
tion of a Memorandum Decision would be the fault

01
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co11nt->el for the party in whose favor the Memorandum
Decision was rendered. However, in this case the Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not submitted to
the trial court for signature because immediately after
tlH· rendition of the Memorandum Decision counsel for
thl· Ap1wllant requested further hearing, which was
gTanted, and over a very extended period of time he
fai!Pd to bring the matter to a hearing, although the
ease was set down for further hearing on :oeveral occa'ions. As the trial court stated, as set out in the tran~eript of the hearing on January 11, 1968, at page 12
of that transcript (R. 292):
The Court: "And then after this nwrnorandum
decision was rendered, I sat this matter for further hearing at the request of John Farr Larsen
at least fifteen times, and every time we would
get ready it was called off, and finally I thought
the matter was settled or I would have still had
my notes, but I threw those away a year ago last
summer."
Counsel for the Respondent admits that he was lenient with the Defendant in attempting to give the Defendant an opportunity to be further heard if he cared
to be lH·arcl, and realizing that the Defendant, during
part of the time at least, was in the State of Washington not free to apr>Par for a hearing in Salt Lake City.
Counse>l for the Respondent has never objected to

·

1

an~1

attempt of the Defendant to have further hearing.

As late as Aprill 22, 1967, present counsel for the Appellant filed the following motion (R. 45-46):
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'.'Defendant mov('S the Court for an order grant.
mg one or more of the following requests a,
follows:
" ( 1) That this case be reopened and a trial date
be granted to complete the unfinished matter~
remaining before the Court on August 1, 19Gr1,
with both parties having leave to amend their
pleadings, or
"(2) That Defendant's attorney, Merrill K. Da1i1,
be granted leave to prepare the Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and to submit
the same to the Court within twenty days from
the date that this motion is heard."

The Respondent filed no objection to the motion to
reopen and set a trial date to complete any mattert
which the Defendant cared to introduce, but when counsel
for the Defendant moved the Court for an order grant·
ing him leave to prepare Findings, Conclusions and Judg·
ment, the Respondent submitted Findings, Conclusiom
and Judgment, because Respondent's counsel was better
informed as to the case and in a better position to file
such than counsel for the Appellant.
Thus, from immediately after the filing of the Memo
randum Decision until April 24, 1967, the Defendant hai
been free to submit any matters to the Court whirl
he cared to do, and no objection of any kind therl'ID
has been entered by the Respondent.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that justice will best be served
hy sustaining the decision of the lower court.
Sueh aetion would certainly be consistent with the
prior decisions of this court in the following cases:

Ericbun vs. l11cC1illough, 91 Utah 159, 63 P. 2d 595;
IJainc Ls. Beckstead, 10 Utah 2d 4, 347 P. 2d 554; John-

;:;on vs. Peoples Finance and Thrift Company, 2 Utah·

2d 246, 272 P. 2d 171; and Wilkins vs. Simond, 14 Utah
2d 406, 385 p. 2d 154.

Respectfully submitted,

MOFFAT, IVERSON AND
TAYLOR
By················································

J. Grant Iverson

Attorneys for Respondent

